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night, a pattern of overall direction, probably from Hanoi.

Since larger numbers of Vietcong attacks have taken place throughout South Vietnam on other nights, it is asked, Why would this be?

Secretary McNamara was asked at his news conference whether the perimeter defense of the installations at Pleiku had been deficient in view of the enemy success.

He said he did not believe "it would ever be possible to protect our forces against a sneak attack of that kind" and added that the mortars had been fired from a considerable distance and that clumps of foliage on the generally open plateau had offered cover.

Reports from Pleiku, however, later established that the Vietcong attackers had been able to crawl right onto the U.S. helicopter base to place explosive charges against barracks' walls and on the airstrip.

A question raised was whether South Vietnamese security troops were ignoring long-standing American advice to increase night patrolling.

Still another question puzzling to some in Washington is why all three attack carriers of the U.S. 7th Fleet were in the South China Sea near the Vietnamese coast at the same time.

The usual pattern is one of dispersal, with each carrier forming the nucleus of an attack force operating off different parts of east Asia.

EFFECT IS QUERIED

A further question was whether the air attacks on North Vietnam would weaken the Vietcong guerrillas tactically or strategically and prevent further Vietcong successes against American installations.

The administration contention clearly is that North Vietnam made possible the attack on Pleiku. But the questions about the incident grow out of the apparent fact that a small Vietcong unit, armed with captured weapons and protected by a lack of field intelligence on the part of the South Vietnamese Army, succeeded in creeping onto the American base and dealing a bloody blow.

Thus, the final question is how much of the responsibility for Pleiku can be held not just to Hanoi but to a failure to prosecute the antiguerilla war in South Vietnam itself in a more vigorous and successful way.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What is the will of the Senate?

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I should like to reply—or rather to express myself briefly—with relation to what the Senator from Alaska [Mr. Gruening], I am told, has said about our situation in South Vietnam. Certainly, no one regrets the present situation more than I do. But it is very true and fundamental, in my opinion, that the prestige of the United States, the whole security of our country, and the whole future of our situation in the Far East depends upon our retaliating quickly and speedily when a U.S. compound is at-

tacked and our men and our airplanes are destroyed. If we take that action lying down, our future in that whole area of the world will be affected adversely.

Without going into any lengthy discussion at the present time, I wish to say that I intend to support the President and the Secretary of Defense in any responsible decisions—and I say they all will be responsible decisions—to retaliate when situations like the present one arise.

What the final determination will be we cannot say at this time. I for one know only what the Secretary of Defense has said, and what I have read in the newspapers. It seems to me fundamental to state that we are in Vietnam, and must maintain our prestige and the strength of our forces there in order to preserve what we stand for. We cannot take an attack lying down and have men in the uniform of our country killed and wounded without letting our enemies know that anyone responsible for such action will meet with swift retaliation. That is what we have done in the present instance. I hope that we shall always retaliate and not allow our boys in uniform to be killed, and take it lying down. That is all I care to say at the present moment.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. CLARK. I commend the Senator from Massachusetts for rising in support of the Johnson administration in his usual broadminded and bipartisan way when a serious question of foreign policy arises.

I suppose I am as discontented with the present situation in Vietnam as is the Senator from Massachusetts. I know perhaps less about the situation than does he as a member of the Committee on Armed Services. But I believe that this is no time to attack the present administration on the floor of the Senate before we have far more information about the background of the raids over the weekend and the retaliation which the President, in his capacity as the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, has ordered. I for one am prepared to give the administration the benefit of the doubt until I know far more about the situation than I know at the present time.

As the acting majority leader, I again thank the Senator from Massachusetts, for his patriotic comments in support of what our President has done.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I appreciate what the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania has said. It seems to me fundamental that it is the only position we can honorably take at the present time.

CUBAN CRISIS COMPARED WITH VIETNAM

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, in this morning's edition of the Washington Post appears an article by the distinguished columnist, Mr. Joseph Alsop, entitled "We Can' Versus 'We Can't,'"

which I believe merits the attention of readers of the RECORD. I have a great respect for Mr. Alsop's opinions, particularly when they relate to the Far East.

However, in the course of his article Mr. Alsop refers to a ratio or a percentage of risk, that we may have weighed in the balance during the Cuban missile crisis.

My comment on this point is not "the rear view" to which he refers in his article, but rather is a comment I made at the very time of the Cuban missile crisis. I stated that I thought that President Kennedy was making the right decision, but I did not think that the possibility of a nuclear war, much less an all-out nuclear war, was very great.

The reason I made that statement then and the reason I repeat it now, is that I did not think Mr. Khrushchev was anywhere near committing suicide. It is unfortunate that Mr. Alsop's otherwise very splendid article should be possibly reduced in its value by an argument over the responsibilities. Nevertheless, I think that the possibilities should be discussed.

I do not agree with Mr. Alsop's view on this particular point, although I do agree with some of his other views.

In connection with this point, there is also an article in the February issue of the Reader's Digest entitled "We Must Stop Red China Now," containing a question-and-answer series involving Dr. William E. Griffith, an outstanding authority on communism. I believe that a reading of that article, coupled with Mr. Alsop's article, might do much to clear the air with respect to where we ought to be going in South Vietnam. I ask unanimous consent that the two articles to which I have referred be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 8, 1965]

"WE CAN" VERSUS "WE CAN'T"

(By Joseph Alsop)

Not long after the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, President Kennedy was reminiscing about this supreme event of his administration.

It all seemed easy enough, he remarked, after the Soviet bluff had been successfully called, but the trouble was no one could be sure, at the outset, that the Soviets really were bluffing.

He was asked what he had thought the odds were, at the outset, that the Soviets were not bluffing. He replied that he had thought the chance that the Soviets meant to go through to the end was somewhere between 1 in 3 and even odds.

It was a chilling thing to hear. For if the Soviets had not been bluffing, the Cuban missile crisis would almost certainly have ended in what the military theorists sweetly call a thermonuclear exchange. And the current Pentagon estimate of the cost to this country of a H-bomb attack is 110 million dead Americans.

In short, President Kennedy very sharply changed the course of history by consciously risking the destruction of 60 percent of the population of the United States when the risk was at least as high as 1 in 3 in his sober, carefully considered opinion. He was helped, no doubt, because he was also conscious that if he submitted to the threat of Soviet missiles in Cuba, most of the people

whom he led and loved would never forgive such a surrender.

Every thinking person is grateful, today, for the dead President's willingness to run this fearful risk. Many are perhaps unaware of the Pentagon price tag above quoted. Many may believe, with the easy wisdom of the rear view, that the risk was not really "1 in 3."

But no thinking person can suppose there was no risk at all that the Kremlin would refuse to back down in October 1962. And no thinking person can suppose that the thing risked—an H-bomb attack—would have been anything but unimaginably awful. All the same, there is unanimity that Mr. Kennedy did right.

These facts provide the context in which to judge the sharp turn that events have taken in the last 48 hours. As these words are written, it is not known whether the President has merely ordered another demonstration, like the one after the trouble in the Gulf of Tonkin; or whether he has at last decided to do whatever may be needed to avert defeat in South Vietnam.

It is not known, in other words, whether he has finally decided to act upon the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his Ambassador in Saigon, Gen. Maxwell Taylor. But whether this is another fruitless one-shot stunt, or whether the President now means business at last, it is worth fitting the reason for his long indecision into the context already provided above.

Previously he has rejected the Joint Chiefs' advice and has done less than Maxwell Taylor wanted done, even at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin, for a basically simple reason. When each successive plan for sterner action against the North Vietnamese aggressors has been presented to the President, he has asked for absolute guarantees that such action would not lead to "another Korea." And the guarantees have not been given, because they could not be given with honesty.

The memory of the proudest episode in this country's proud postwar history as burden-bearer of the free world has in fact paralyzed our highest councils instead of inspiring them.

The practical political reasons why this has happened—the narrow murmurings of Senator RICHARD RUSSELL, the President's own memories of the opposition's squalid post-Korea behavior, and so on and on—hardly need emphasis.

What needs emphasis is the bizarre lunacy of the people who insist we can quite properly do what we did in October 1962 whereas we cannot again do what we did in Korea. The figures speak for themselves. In October 1962 President Kennedy took a substantial risk of 110 million casualties in this country. The Korean war was hard and cruel as well as proud, but it cost us, in dead and wounded, only 137,000 casualties.

Those men fell to defend all that had been defended and gained for their country by those who fell at Tarawa, Iwo Jima, Guadalcanal, and Saipan—who also numbered less than 300,000. Where then is our common-sense, that we shrink and fall back, and shrink and fall back until the lives of millions must again be risked?

We have waited overlong. With Kosygin at Hanoi, the danger is far greater than it was not so very long ago. But the choice is the same, and the figures are the same, and the price of failure is the same.

[From the Reader's Digest, February 1965]
WE MUST STOP RED CHINA Now

An apprehensive shudder traveled through the free world last fall when Red China exploded its first nuclear device. Since then, the Chinese have become increasingly belligerent in sensitive areas around the globe. How should the United States and its allies respond to this new and menacing offensive?

In this interview, conducted by the editors of The Reader's Digest, Dr. William E. Griffith, an outstanding authority on communism, offers a series of specific proposals designed to contain the strengthened Chinese influence. Dr. Griffith is director of the International Communism Project at the MIT Center for International Studies. He is also professor of Soviet diplomacy in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, and author of "The Sino-Soviet Rift."

Question. Dr. Griffith, what is the significance of Red China's explosion of a nuclear device?

Answer. To the Chinese people, and to many others throughout the world, the device is proof that Red China now has the essential element of becoming an independent power—atomic capacity. The political effect of this is already apparent. More and more people, even in India and Japan, are beginning to think that the wave of the future, at least in areas like southeast Asia, is not red, white and blue, but yellow.

China is the first underdeveloped country the first Asian country and the first colored country that has produced an atomic bomb. There is no question that the Chinese are highly proud of this achievement and now realize that all the privations have not been in vain. If they don't have butter, at least they do have a very big gun.

From our point of view, the most alarming aspect is the type of device that was exploded. The official statement of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission indicates that the Chinese used uranium 235, very likely produced in a gaseous-diffusion plant. This is an enormously expensive operation, involving tremendous amounts of electric power, and it indicates that Chinese technology and engineering may be much more advanced than we had thought. Moreover, the fact that the Chinese have uranium 235 indicates that they will be able to get an H-bomb much more rapidly than had been thought—probably within 2 or 3 years.

For the present at least, one should think fundamentally of the Chinese nuclear device as a political advantage, rather than a military gain. Red China still lacks an effective delivery system for the A-bomb. There is no reason, however, to suppose that the Chinese cannot eventually develop one.

Question. Apart from the bomb, have the Chinese been doing well in extending their influence?

Answer. The Chinese are dizzy with success. They were the greatest winners from the fall of Khrushchev. In Asia the Chinese now have primary influence over the North Vietnamese. By supporting the North Koreans in the Korean war, they have won primary influence over North Korea, and the Russians have lost it. They have drawn Cambodia and Burma into their orbit. They defeated the Indians humiliatingly and disastrously in November 1962. They have isolated the Indians from all the other southeast Asian powers, which are now so frightened by Red China that they are in the process of trying to come to terms with Peking. The Chinese have tremendous sway over the Indonesians. And Chinese influence even extends into Europe, for Albania is virtually a Chinese satellite.

Question. What do these successes mean in terms of China's role in world affairs?

Answer. The rise of Red China presents an entirely new situation in the world balance of power. China is a revolutionary power with global ambitions. It is determined to replace Moscow at the head of what the Chinese would consider a completely purified and revolutionary world Communist movement.

The Chinese think that the wave of victory which they are riding will engulf the underdeveloped countries, particularly those in

the Southern Hemisphere, where people who are both poor and colored resent the wealthy white countries, including Russia. China counts on the frustrations, the weakness, and the fear of the colored peoples of the world to drive them into Peking's control. That is why they are working so hard—and effectively—in Africa and Latin America.

Question. How, exactly, do the Chinese operate in these areas?

Answer. They have various weapons. Their first weapon is money—they are spending hundreds of millions of dollars a year on their worldwide operations. In Latin America the Chinese have encouraged Castro to support the guerrillas in Venezuela. They have allied with him in a struggle to win supremacy over Latin American communism and, in the process, to depose the pro-Soviet heads of the big Latin American Communist Parties—in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. They do not have diplomatic missions in Latin America, but they frequently use their news agency offices—the New China News Agency—as their base for subversion and bribery.

The Chinese carry on an immense propaganda operation, not only with very extensive broadcasts, but also with an immense amount of literature. They publish their magazines and articles in about 15 languages and spread them around the world with no thought of cost. These things are very well done, and there is no question that they have some influence. At the University of Caracas in Venezuela, for example, you don't see Russian literature, you don't see American literature—you see Chinese literature, in impeccable Spanish. It is tailor-made for the young, the radical, the violent, the dissatisfied, the frustrated.

In Africa, the Chinese think they have great chances, because they feel the future there holds more turmoil, more tribal and ethnic warfare, and more anarchy and chaos—the kind of violence which they have only to urge on. For this reason they have aided the revolutionaries in Zanzibar, the rebels in the Congo. They are trying to buy up, to influence and to give training and political and ideological direction to the dissatisfied, frustrated radicals in all countries of black Africa.

Question. China is doing all this, and yet, internally, it is a weak country?

Answer. Yes. This is the most remarkable aspect of its achievements. Not only is it a weak country with an enormous population growth, but it has probably become weaker in the last 5 years. China was hard hit when the Russians took back all their technical experts and stopped all economic aid in 1960. The stagnation of Chinese industry in the last 5 years is almost unparalleled in any Communist country. Furthermore, the Chinese ran into a series of very bad harvests. They've been buying the wheat surpluses of Canada and Australia for some years now; only in this way have they been able to keep going in the food sector.

One must remember, however, that throughout history China has always had immense problems arising from its tremendous population, from recurrent bad harvests and floods of its great rivers. The Communist Government, if nothing else, has produced a degree of discipline which prevents wholesale catastrophe; even at the worst of the economic crisis in 1960-61, there was no mass starvation in China.

The Chinese seem for the present to be concentrating primarily on agriculture. Given their population problems, they probably can do little else. The population of China is estimated to be somewhere around 650 to 700 million, and estimates of the rate of population increase have ranged as high as 25 million a year. This explains their interest in southeast Asia, which is traditionally a great rice-producing area.